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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
K & K Insurance Agency, Inc., Plaintiff/Respondent, (herein, 
K & K), took delivery of a Hermes 51 computer-type typewriter 
with screen from Salt Lake Typewriter, Inc., Defendant/Appellant, 
(herein S. L. Typewriter), on March 30, 1987 and purchased it for 
($2,977.92) Two Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Seven Dollars and 
Ninety-Two Cents on July 29, 1987. (R. 2). 
The typewriter was defective and never made operational by 
S. L. Typewriter. (R. 20). K & K filed a complaint seeking 
relief for revocation of acceptance under Sec. 70A-2-608 U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended) Uniform Commercial Code, and rescission 
thereunder. (R. 1). 
K & K filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the 
affidavit of Mary B. Strang (attached as Addendum "D" hereto) the 
Manager of K & K. (R. 19). At the hearing on October 12, 1988, 
S. L. Typewriter presented the affidavit of Douglas Thompson 
(Addendum B to Appellant's brief) (R. 53) and some other 
affidavits. Counsel for K & K objected on the grounds of 
untimeliness and the court sustained the objection and the 
affidavits were disallowed. (R. 105 pg. 3 L. 3-16). Counsel for 
K & K also objected to the affidavit of Odell L. Sanders 
(Addendum C to Appellant's brief) under Rule 56(e) as being 
opinion, conclusory and failing to set forth facts that would be 
admitted into evidence. (R. 105 pg. 4-5). The court granted K & 
K's summary judgment motion. Counsel for K & K also represented 
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t~ the c^ *:^ J- t^ i-1- •t"uo ^vrevrit^r h*^ been fixed by another 
repairman pric r n + :.t neariny on October *38. IK. 105 pg. 
3 1 •-' Typewriter's counsel it th-: hearing was Gayle 
D^a ;. , .3 • ;;n_ :\ n, - • *" , ^  -j , 
M - .: ,. T ;;;..*'.."• - " : -ndec 
Uniform Jommoic. - : (He ecuc. .r Goods) i at, t-. ~ i-e' . 
7 .A-2--.. '-i, ' (19S3, a.-* amended; 'nifc; ; Commercial Code, 
(Revocation of Acceptance) as was argued by K & K. ^. ^^o pg. 
7 ) . 
S. L Typewriter h.::*.:j present counsel, 1.,-tir: .i . .r H. 
Fankhauser, Esq. who filed r 4 - +• - -,;*-. T^e*:! >r vacate 
w h i c h *;:.•; heard on December 14, 198.-' and denied at that t :-e-. S. 
I- Tvnevriter claimed " s : : r v *-••"n n^wly discovered evidence 
t-<.~.^ ; i: f , . i». ' ,. * "' • • "-: cer 
12, 19<3o hearing and learning ci*.i: nu t; pewri;-crr w^^ operating. 
(R. 10" i• « ; Typewriter claimed that this information 
was concealed or not made known to ihe ccurt en October 12, 1988. 
(R ;--
TL>- n-. : i . - .:. . . s: .- . : 
the ccurt _v i - advised .: tins inrormation D\ •• -i K's -Counsel 
October l, 1988. .'5 pq . lu .. -S-; . . ; ne court denied S. 
L, TypH'.vrit^v-' -, _,
 r ^  > -inij tr.s appeal ensued. v. the nearing en 
December 1 I v!>--.;r- nor i^er :^oi *-~ re- ..ntrodece th-
affidavit of i JO • •- '-.-•• ' . \ \ ~ r - -h--± - ::e: 
which had been excluded at: the summary judgment hearing or. 
October 12, 1988 as well as the affidavit of Odel Sanders 
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(Addendum C to Appellant's brief) which failed to meet the 
requirements of 56(e). (R. 106 pg. 11-12). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
K & K purchased a Hermes 51 Typewriter (computer-like with 
screen) from S. L. Typewriter in July 29, 1987 for ($2, 977.92) 
Two Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Seven Dollars and Ninety-Two 
Cents. (R. 2 para. 7-9). The typewriter was to be the personal 
typewriter of Mary B. Strang. (R. 19 Addendum flD!f) . From the 
beginning, the typewriter had problems with the memory (R. 19-20, 
para. 5). S. L. Typewriter made several service calls and failed 
to correct any of the problems (R. 2 0 para. 6). S. L. Typewriter 
often failed to respond to calls for service and to keep service 
appointments. (R. 20 para. 7). S. L. Typewriter claimed that a 
surge protector was necessary to use the machine and protect the 
memory storage. (R. 20 para. 9). K & K, on the advice of S. L. 
Typewriter, used the recommended surge protector but the machine 
continued to malfunction. (R. 2 0 para. 10). K & K continued to 
use an older Hermes 51 Typewriter ( K & K owned a previous model) 
which operated along side the newer typewriter in dispute without 
problems and without the surge protector on the same circuit. (R. 
89 para. 3, affidavit of Robert Kaufman attached as Addendum "E" 
hereto). 
The surge protector was inexpensive costing ($79.68) 
Seventy-Nine Dollars and Sixty-Eight Cents (R. 7) but was 
returned because it did nothing to remedy the problem. (R. 89 
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para. 6) The problem, with the typewriter's memory was that the 
memory could be erased without warning. All work would nave r: 
be redone each time the memory cleared, R. 2 0 para. . 
T/pewr: tf?i - • • \/er* ah If to f i nc;l the -."K. -.^  of the •-!:/• ': 
2'"" par : 
At the hearing for summary "judgment, S. T Typewriter's 
counsel, ther fl,\ -:.JI t , attempted r.< surr r seme counter-
affidavits including • '.^  na . ; "hompsor Addendum 
Appellant' . - . 
being unt. :u- * ; 
affidavit + Odei: 
failed t o zo mp1v 
Typewriter failed 
t.: d o -~r u:. i>t; *> 
briefed r^v: Meadea under a rneory .;i -evocation ct acceptance 
under Se^:, )&-2-i*o'c i-xu, pa l *ie affidavit ct Miry. : 
Strann k- v repared a-= ~f Ma lf,P8, (Addendum 7" o -.oar::" 
c .. . *.. ... « .,• . 
to October * i^oo ' * ea. mc; .n Jet ^ oei ^ IJ.J -, tiie 
court was specifically told b\- K .s. - junsc. :hit the machine 
had been repaired. 
"Now, as recently - - the machine had sat there for some 
time, and as recently, I believe as two months ago, 
another repairman came out to fix some other machines. 
He took the - - got into this machine, and found the 
bare wire and di d fi x it " (R .1 05 pg. 10 L, 8-21) . 
K & K finally, after promises made by S. L. Typewriter ; » 
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Sanders (Aadendur Appellart's crief; 
v i t h k\: . • '- : o pg. 4 - - , . 5. 
*" r [ e f * ^ i i r p o r t* i r r^  : i n' 
. *- e i e < . . ..* 
j A - ^ - '-> •. ;- pi n e r e a s 
make the typewriter operable, were not kept and after the surge 
protector failed to remedy the problem on February 29, 1988 
(after sending the wrong notice to itself on February 5, 1988) 
sent S. L. Typewriter notice of revocation of acceptance (R. 11 
Exhibit. C). Receiving no response, K & K filed its complaint on 
March 22, 1988. 
After the typewriter was delivered on March 30, 1987, until 
it was paid for on July 29, 1987 and thereafter S. L. Typewriter 
promised that the typewriter would be replaced or made operable. 
(R. 89 para. 3). 
S. L. Typewriter, after promising several service calls, 
never returned to make the machine operable. (R. 2 0 para. 7). 
Just prior to two court proceedings, S. L. Typewriter called and 
said they would send a repairman to fix the typewriter but never 
did and failed at any time to do so. (R. 89 para. 5). 
In April, 1988 an Associated Business Products repairman who 
was on the premises to repair other office equipment, volunteered 
to look at the typewriter, at no charge, and after removing the 
cover, found a broken wire which made the machine inoperable. (R. 
89 para. 6). There never was the need for a surge protector and 
was was not the problem with the machine. (R. 89 para. 6). This 
information was disclosed to the court and counsel for S. L. 
Typewriter at the October 12, 1988 summary judgment hearing. (R. 
105, pg. 10 L. 18-21). 
After the summary judgment hearing on October 12, 1988, S. 
L. Typewriter made a "surprise" visit to the office of K & K and 
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found the typewriter operating. (R. 106 pg. 7). Even though this 
was clearly represented to the court on October 12, 1988, at the 
summary judgment hearing. (R. 105, pg. 10 L. 18-21). S. L. 
Typewriter claimed this discovery as the basis for its motion 
under Rule 59 which was heard by the court on December 14, 1988 
and denied. The court was annoyed because of S. L. Typewriter's 
tactics in failing to timely file its affidavits, and S. L. 
Typewriter's change of counsel who attempted to re-submit 
affidavits, (Addendum B), which the court had previously 
disallowed, and to re-argue the summary judgment motion based on 
a "surprise" visit which merely confirmed information already 
presented to the court on October 12, 1988 and which S. L. 
Typewriter incorrectly represented on December 14, 1988 to the 
court at its Rule 59 motion and to this court in its brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court properly granted summary judgment when considering 
affidavits that were untimely presented by S. L. Typewriter as 
well as the affidavit which was presented and failed to comply 
with Rule 56(e) for the proper form of an admissable affidavit. 
The court subsequently, when the affidavits were attempted to be 
re-introduced, properly denied S. L. Typewriter's Rule 59 motion 
to amend, alter or vacate summary judgment. 
The court properly concluded that there were no genuine 
issues of fact and appropriately entered summary judgment against 
S. L. Typewriter. 
This case involves revocation of acceptance under the 
7 
Uniform Commercial Code 70A-2-608. The Appellant argued and 
still insists that there must be rejection within a reasonable 
time. A buyer may revoke his acceptance of goods whose non-
conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has 
accepted it on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity 
would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured or without 
discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably 
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance 
or by the seller's assurances. This court properly found that K 
& K accepted the typewriter with the assurance of S. L. 
Typewriter, that it would be made to work properly by a surge 
protector or otherwise, and S. L. Typewriter ignored or refused 
to make the typewriter operate properly. Another repairman 
repaired a broken wire at no charge. This fact was clearly 
represented to the court at the summary judgment hearing on 
October 12, 1988 as the record reflects. 
The Appellant's argument of a "surprise" visit and discovery 
that the typewriter was operating after the October 12, 1988, 
summary judgment hearing has absolutely no merit. There was no 
surprise, no concealment of material facts and no newly 
discovered evidence. S. L. Typewriter re-argued a motion it had 
already lost and attempted to present affidavits whose admission 
was already denied because they were untimely. S. L. Typewriter 
failed even in its second attempt on its Rule 59 motion and still 
fails to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER SINCE 
THE APPELLANT FAILED TO TIMELY FILE ANY AFFIDAVITS 
OR MATERIALS TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS A MATERIAL 
ISSUE OF FACT FOR TRIAL. 
When a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by Subdivision (e) of Rule 56, the 
trial court may properly conclude that there are no genuine 
issues of fact unless the face of the movant's affidavit 
affirmatively discloses the existence of such an issue. Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1983); Cowen and Co., v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1984); Busch Corp v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 743 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1987). 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, K & K set 
forth the material facts supported by the affidavit of Mary B. 
Strang. 
At the hearing for motion for summary judgment, K & K argued 
"Revocation of Acceptance" under Section 70A-2-608 U.C.A. (1953, 
as amended) Uniform Commercial Code. (Addendum A attached 
hereto). Sec. 70A-2-608 states: 
"(1) The Buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or 
commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially 
impairs its value to him if he has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its 
nonconformity would be cured and it has not 
been seasonably cured; or 
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if 
his acceptance was reasonably induced either 
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by the difficulty of discovery before 
acceptance or by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable 
time after the buyer discovers or should have 
discovered the ground for it and before any substantial 
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by 
their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer 
notifies the seller of it. 
K & K, after purchase of the typewriter, found that it had 
unknown defects. The seller, S. L. Typewriter, insisted that 
additional equipment be purchased to wit: a surge protector. K 
& K purchased the surge protector and yet the typewriter 
continued to malfunction. S. L. Typewriter was called to service 
the machine and was never able to fix it although S. L. 
Typewriter promised to remedy the situation. 
After each failure to cure the defect, S. L. Typewriter 
would say that the problem was something else and that S. L. 
Typewriter would fix on their next trip. Even after the 
typewriter was supposedly fixed, it would fail to function. The 
typewriter sat idle for months, except for periodic attempts of 
S. L. Typewriter to repair it. 
Only after S. L. Typewriter refused to repair the typewriter 
any longer did K & K realize that the ($2,977.92) Two Thousand 
Nine Hundred Seventy-Seven Dollars and Ninety-Two Cents spent on 
the typewriter was wasted. K & K revoked its acceptance after 
learning that S. L. Typewriter would no longer attempt to cure 
the defects that kept the machine from functioning. It was 
reasonable that K & K assume that S. L. Typewriter would be able 
to repair the typewriter. K & K had been assured by S. L. 
Typewriter that only more time was needed to cure the defect. S. 
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L. Typewriter never did cure the defect. K & K notified S. L. 
Typewriter within a reasonable time after it became apparent that 
S. L. Typewriter either could not, or would not, repair the 
typewriter. The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes the problem 
of recovering payments for rejected goods. K & K, by revoking 
its acceptance of a defective typewriter, is entitled to the 
remedies of Sec. 70A-2-711. K & K under Utah law and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (See 
Lockhart v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). 
While there may exist minor disputes between the facts 
proposed by the papers, there exists no genuine factual dispute. 
Recently, the United States Supreme Court clarified the "genuine 
factual issue" under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is identical to Utah's Rule 56. In Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 
(1986) the court stated: 
"Rule 56 (e) provides that, when a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse 
party7 must set forth specified facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial'... Rule 56 (c) 
provides that the trial judge shall then grant summary 
judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and if the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. There is no requirement 
that the trial judge make findings of fact. The 
inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of 
determining whether there is the need for a trial-
whether, in other words, there are genuine factual 
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder 
of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in 
favor of either party... 
The judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks 
whether reasonable jurors could find, by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff, is 
entitled to a verdict - - 'whether there is [evidence] 
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upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a 
verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus 
of proof is imposed.'" 
The U.C.C. does not allow for excuses from the seller 
regarding a defect. The buyer has only to prove the defect and 
revoke acceptance to recover the purchase price. It does not 
matter how hard S. L. Typewriter tried to cure the defects. It 
only matters that S. L. Typewriter failed to cure. That was 
clearly established in the affidavits of Mary B. Strang and 
Robert D. Kaufman (Addendum D & E) which were uncontroverted. 
At the hearing on motion for summary judgment on October 12, 
1988, S. L. Typewriter attempted to introduce the affidavit of 
Donald Thompson (Addendum B, Appellant's brief) which the court 
rejected as being untimely. Rule 56(c), provides that adverse 
party, prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits 
and Rule 6(d), provides that opposing affidavits may be served 
not later than (1) one day before the hearing. Accordingly, the 
court held that the affidavit was untimely filed and disallowed 
its use at the summary judgment hearing. 
The court also had before it the affidavit in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment executed by Odell L. Sanders. 
The court found that this affidavit failed to meet the 
requirements of Rule 56(e) which are "supporting or opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissable in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein". Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
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or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. See also Rainford v. Ryttinq, 22 
Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769 (1969); Trebogqan v. Treboqqan, 699 
P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). The court readily found that the rambling 
dissertation in letter format dated, April 13, 1988, failed to 
comply with the requirements of the rule. An affidavit does not 
comport with the requirements of this rule where it reveals no 
evidentiary facts but merely reflects the affiant's 
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in regard to the 
transaction. Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973). More importantly, S. L. Typewriter 
failed to set forth any specific facts upon which there was a 
material dispute or issue for trial which could only lead the 
judge to the conclusion that there were none and that K & K was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT CONTINUALLY INCORRECTLY ARGUES 
TIMELINESS OF REJECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF 
REJECTION UNDER SEC. 70A-2-602 U.C.A. (1953, AS 
AMENDED), UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, WHEN THE COMPLAINT 
AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE THE COURT WERE 
BASED UPON REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE UNDER SEC. 70A-2-
608 U.C.A. (1953, AS AMENDED), UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
S. L. Typewriter, at the motion for summary judgment hearing 
on October 12, 1988, failed to respond to K & K's arguments under 
Sec. 70A-2-608 Uniform Commercial Code (supra) but rather 
mistakenly argued Sec. 70A-2-602 and still continues to do so. 
Revocation of acceptance, was argued by K & K Insurance. 
S. L. Typewriter's reliance on Sec. 70A-2-602, which 
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provides for rejection of goods after their delivery, is 
misplaced and obviously S. L. Typewriter failed to address the 
issues raised by 70A-2-608 and gave the trial judge no 
alternative but to grant K & K's motion for summary judgment. 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO ALTER, AMEND OR VACATE PURSUANT TO RULE 59 
U.R.C.P. IN THAT THERE WAS NO "SURPRISE11 OR NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
S. L. Typewriter, in its brief, argues that at the hearing 
on October 12, 1988, that K & K did not make known to the court 
that on that date the typewriter was operational. This 
representation is entirely incorrect and contrary to the record 
which states: 
"Now, as recently - - the machine had sat there for some 
time, in as recently, I believe is two months ago, another 
repairman came out to fix some other machines. He took the 
- - got into this machine, and found the bare wire and did 
fix it but, nonetheless, the U.C.C. provides that upon 
revocation, we're entitled to our money back.,". (R. 105,pg. 
10 L. 18-21). 
It was upon S. L. Typewriter's claim to non-disclosure of 
this fact that it claimed it should have been entitled to a new 
trial or to alter, amend or vacate the previous judgment under 
Rule 59 which is clearly not the case. There was no newly 
discovered evidence and there was no fact that was withheld from 
or misrepresented to the court at the summary judgment hearing on 
October 12, 1988. S. L. Typewriter's reliance on their 
"surprise" visit to K & K's place of business did not divulge 
any new facts which were not already divulged previously to the 
court. As S. L. Typewriter has failed even as of this date to 
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list the material facts on which there is a dispute, there are no 
issues upon which this matter should be tried. 
CONCLUSION 
The court properly granted motion for summary judgment under 
Rule 56 when the court had before it a properly executed 
affidavit of K & K. S. L. Typewriter failed to timely file 
opposing affidavits and the affidavit that it did file, failed to 
meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) and the case law which in 
effect, left K & K's motion for summary judgment unopposed. S.L. 
Typewriter failed to brief or argue revocation of acceptance 
under the Uniform Commercial Code but incorrectly argued and 
continues to argue rejection after delivery. 
At the hearing for motion for summary judgment, it was 
disclosed by K & K that the typewriter, on that date, was 
operable and there was no misrepresentation or other newly 
discovered evidence as claimed by S. L. Typewriter in its 
"surprise" visit. The record totally belies the contentions made 
by S. L. Typewriter in this regard. . 
Respectfully submitted on this £L)4 — day of 
>fCL* , , 1989. 
JOHN^ fe. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
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SALES 70A-2-609 
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance 
was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery 
before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. 
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after 
the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and 
before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is 
not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer 
notifies the seller of it. 
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard 
to the goods involved as if he had rejected them. 
History. L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-608. 
Cross-References. 
Effect of acceptance, 70A-2-607. 
Improper delivery, buyer's rights, 
70A-2-601. 
Proof of market price, 70A-2-723. 
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204. 
Rightful rejection, manner and effect, 
70A-2-602. 
Waiver of buyer's objections by failure to 
particularize, 70A-2-605. 
"Reasonable time." 
What constitutes a "reasonable time" for 
revocation of acceptance under this section is 
usually a question of fact to be determined in 
light of the circumstances of the particular 
case, and the supreme court upon review will 
not disturb a finding on the issue unless 
there is no reasonable basis in the evidence 
to sustain it. Christopher v. Larson Ford 
Sales, Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009. 
Where purchasers of a motor home, upon 
finding a number of defects in the vehicle, 
sought to rescind the contract the day after 
it was entered, but were persuaded by the 
seller to retain the vehicle and take it on a 
planned trip to California, during which time 
the already noted problems persisted and 
new ones became manifest so that the day 
after they returned home purchasers again 
attempted rescission, they acted within a 
"reasonable time" within the meaning of this 
section. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Sales <S=> 179, 427. 
77 CJS Sales § 225; 78 CJS Sales § 520. 
67 AmJur 2d 919 to 926, Sales §§ 710 to 716. 
Measure and elements of buyer's recovery 
upon revocation of acceptance of goods under 
UCC § 2-608 (1), 65 ALR 3d 388. 
Time for revocation of acceptance of goods 
under UCC § 2-608 (2), 65 ALR 3d 354. 
What constitutes "substantial impair-
ment" entitling buyer to revoke his accep-
tance of goods under UCC § 2-608, 98 ALR 3d 
1183. 
70A-2-609. Right to adequate assurance of performance, 
(1) A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the 
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be 
impaired. When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with 
respect to the performance of either party the other may in writing 
demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he 
receives such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend 
any performance for which he has not already received the agreed 
return. 
(2) Between merchants the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity 
and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined 
according to commercial standards. 
(3) Acceptance of any improper delivery or payment does not prejudice 
the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future 
performance. 
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Deduction of damages from the price, 
70A-2-717. 
Notice and notification, 70A-1-201. 
Performance or acceptance under reserva-
tion of rights, 70A-1-207. 
Reasonable time, 70A-1-204. 
Revocation of acceptance in whole or in 
part, 70A-2-608. 
Waiver of buyer's objections by failure to 
particularize, 70A-2-605. 
Warranty against infringement, 70A-2-312. 
"Reasonable time." 
Where purchasers of a motor home, upon 
finding a number of defects in the vehicle, 
sought to rescind the contract the day after 
it was entered, but were persuaded by the 
seller to retain the vehicle and take it on a 
planned trip to California, during which time 
the already noted problems persisted and 
new ones became manifest so that the day 
after they returned home purchasers again 
attempted rescission, they acted within a 
"reasonable time" within the meaning of this 
section. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
Inc. (1976) 557 P 2d 1009. 
Collateral References. 
Indemnity <£=> 10, 12; Sales <3=> 179, 285, 
288 (2), 427. 
42 CJS Indemnity § 15; 77 CJS Sales §§ 218, 
225, 339, 346; 78 CJS Sales § 520. 
67 AmJur 2d 554 to 559, Sales §§ 399 to 401. 
Acceptance after agreed time of delivery as 
waiver of damages on account of seller's 
delay, 80 ALR 322. 
Buyer's acceptance of delayed installment 
of goods as waiver of similar default as to 
later installments, 32 ALR 2d 1128. 
Buyer's acceptance of part of goods as 
affecting right to damages for failure to com-
plete delivery, 169 ALR 595. 
Form and substance of notice which buyer 
of goods must give in order to recover dam-
ages for seller's breach of warranty, 53 ALR 
2d 270. 
Misrouting as affecting duty of the buyer 
to accept goods, 46 ALR 1120. 
Purchaser's use or attempted use of arti-
cles known to be defective as affecting dam-
ages recoverable for breach of warranty, 33 
ALR 2d 511. 
Right of seller as condition of delivery to 
insist on or resort to means not provided by 
contract to assure payment, 44 ALR 443. 
Seller's right to retain down payment on 
buyer's unjustified refusal to accept goods, 11 
ALR 2d 701. 
Seller's waiver of sales contract provision 
limiting time within which buyer may object 
to or return goods or article for defects or 
failure to comply with warranty or repre-
sentations, 24 ALR 2d 717. 
Sufficiency and timeliness of buyer's notice 
under UCC § 2-607 of seller's breach of war-
ranty, 93 ALR 3d 363. 
Use of article by buyer as waiver of right 
to rescind for fraud, breach of warranty, or 
failure of goods to comply with contract, 41 
ALR 2d 1173. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Counterclaim of buyer. 
Breach of promise or agreement on part of 
seller to furnish demonstrator does not 
defeat the right of seller to recover for goods 
sold, but saves to the purchaser the right to 
offset by way of counterclaim for any dam-
ages which may have been sustained by 
reason of the failure of the seller to perform 
that part of its agreement. Detroit Vapor 
Stove Co. v. Farmers' Cash Union (1923) 61 U 
567, 216 P 1075. 
Proffer return of goods lay buyer. 
Where a horse was bought with the knowl-
edge of both parties that he was to be used 
for breeding purposes and the horse proved 
to be sterile but died before it could be 
returned, buyer was not barred from recov-
ery by his failure to proffer the return of the 
carcass nor could seller raise his own good 
faith as a defense where no fraud was 
claimed or shown as it was assumed by the 
court that both parties acted in good faith in 
respect to the defective horse. Ericksen v. 
Poulsen (1984) 15 \] 2d 190,3S9 P 2d 739. 
70A-2-608. Revocation of acceptance in whole or in part. 
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit 
whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he 
has accepted it 
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would 
be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or 
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70A-2-710 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
of warranty, signing of satisfaction card by 
defendant without reading its contents, on 
representation of seller's agent that it only 
contained statement that agent was present, 
did not estop defendant from denying state-
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-710. 
Damages incidental to resale. 
Seller had no right to damages incidental 
to resale where buyer failed to make pay-
ment after delivery and seller had retained 
no security interest in the goods nor had any 
right to repossess by means of self-help. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-711. 
Cross-References. 
Buyer's damages for breach in regard to 
accepted goods, 70A-2-714. 
ment of satisfaction in card. Consolidated 
Wagon & Machine Co. v. Wright (1920) 56 U 
382, 190 P 937, distinguished in 75 U 124, 283 
P731. 
Bullock v. Joe Bailey Auction Co. (1978) 580 P 
2d 225. 
Collateral References. 
Sales e=s 370, 384, 391 (1). 
78 CJS Sales § 477 et seq. 
67 AmJur 2d 751, 810, Sales §§ 560, 613. 
Buyer's rights on improper delivery, 
70A-2-601. 
Cure by seller of improper tender or deliv-
ery, 70A-2-508. 
Installment contract, 70A-2-612. 
70A-2-710. Sellers incidental damages. Incidental damages to an 
aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and 
custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or 
resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach. 
70A-2-711. Buyer's remedies in general — Buyer's security interest 
in rejected goods. 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer 
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with 
respect to any goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the 
breach goes to the whole contract (section 70A-2-612), the buyer 
may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to 
recovering so much of the price as has been paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as to all 
the goods affected whether or not they have been identified 
to the contract; or 
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter 
(section 70A-2-713). 
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer may also 
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as provided 
in this chapter (section 70A-2-502); or 
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or replevy the 
goods as provided in this chapter (section 70A-2-716). 
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance a buyer 
has a security interest in goods in his possession or control for any 
payments made on their price and any expenses reasonably incur-
red in their inspection, receipt, transportation, care and custody 
and may hold such goods and resell them in like manner as an 
aggrieved seller (section 70A-2-706). 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
•How trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
" pefault judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
M obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
-mnmons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970). 
? Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra-
nam v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. 
t* Am. JUT- 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
t C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
f A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
*•• Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 92 to 134. 
Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
~ (a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
? (b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
?; (c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
«ay of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
&o genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
ffcnuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
•„. W) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
Judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
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trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial control 
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or N 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
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ADDENDUM D 
on 
JOHN B. ANDERSON #091 
WILLIAM A. SOMPPI #4916 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
623 E a s t F i r s t South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84102 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 363-9345 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, ] 
Plaintiff , ] 
v s . ; 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, I N C . , ] 
a Utah corpora t ion , 
Defendant.. ' 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARY B. STRANG 
CIVIL NO. 883003265--CV 
) JUDGE ELEANOR S. VAN SCIVER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARY B. STRANG, b e i n g f i r s t d u l y s w o r n , upon o a t h , 
s t a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
1. That Affiant i s over e ighteen years of age and has 
personal knowledge concerning the facts of th is case. 
2. That Affiant i s the Manager of K & K Insurance 
Agency. 
3. That the Hermes 51 Typewriter purchased from S a l t 
Lake Typewriter was to be the personal typewriter of the Affiant. 
4. That the Affiant f i r s t rece ived the typewri te r on 
May 30, 1987 and payment was sent to S a l t Lake Typewriter in 
Ju ly , 1987. 
5. That from the beginning the typewriter had problems 
with the memory, the screen, missing covers, broken paper holder 
and other features that failed to function. 
6. That Salt Lake Typewriter made several service 
calls and failed to correct any of the problems, 
7. That Salt Lake Typewriter often failed to respond to 
calls for service and to keep service appointments. 
8. That Salt Lake Typewriter on one occasion kept the 
machine for three weeks and could not find the cause of the 
problems. 
9. That Salt Lake Typewriter claimed that a surge-
protector was necessary to use the machine and protect the memory 
storage. 
10. That K St K Insurance, on the advice of Salt Lake 
Typewriter, used the recommended surge-protector but the machine 
continued to malfunction. 
11. That Salt Lake Typewriter is the only distributor 
for Hermes products in the Salt Lake area and the only supplier 
for ribbons, the platten and speciality items for Hermes products. 
12. That problems with the typewriter's memory was that 
the memory would be erased without warning. 
13. That with the failing typewriter memory, all work 
would have to be redone each time the memory cleared. 
14. That the memory failed as many as several time per 
day. 
15. That Salt Lake Typewriter never was able to find 
the cause of the problem. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT sayeth naught. 
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worked properly from March 30, 1987 the date it was delivered to 
April, 1988, or eleven (11) months after the Plaintiff had 
possession and failed to operate for seven (7) months after it 
was paid for. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT sayeth naught. 
DATED this > ^ day of November, 1988. 
(p. &jj°r'r&l^f^A 
ROBERT D. KAUFMAN, Affiant 
r)* /'' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ; T' r\ day of November, 
1988. » 
Notary' Pubii-cT ^ / 
Residing /Ln Salt Lake City,^UT 
My Commission Expires: r commission 
'Q~>r^ I iiJ. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Ik The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 5— day 
of September, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit of Robert D. Kaufman, was mailed, postage prepaid to 
Defendant's Attorney E. H. Fankhauser, 243 East 400 South, Suite 
200, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
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JOHN B. ANDERSON #091 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
623 East First South 
P. 0. Box 11643 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84147-0643 
Telephone: (801) 363-9345 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
K & K INSURANCE AGENCY, ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. KAUFMAN 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS. ) CIVIL NO. 883003265-CV 
SALT LAKE TYPEWRITER, INC., ) JUDGE ELEANOR S. VAN SCIVER 
a Utah corporation, ) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
ROBERT D. KAUFMAN, being first duly sworn, upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. That he is the owner of K & K Insurance Agency, the 
Plaintiff above-named. 
2. On March 30, 1987, the Hermes 51 Typewriter was 
delivered to 654 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, K & K's 
offices. K & K had an older Hermes 51 Typewriter which was in 
operation at that location. The new Hermes 51 Typewriter never 
worked properly, i.e. would lose its memory and all settings; 
while K & K was located at 654 South 900 East. After allowing 
the Defendant to take the machine for three weeks and after 
purchasing a surge protector on June 1, 1987, the machine still 
did not work properly. 
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3. Based upon the promises of the Defendant that it 
would be replaced or corrected to Affiant's satisfaction and 
needs, Affiant paid the Defendant the purchase price on July 29, 
1987, . Check #4574 in the amount of $2,977,92. The Defendant, 
after promising several service calls, never returned to make the 
machine work properly. The surge protector did not cure the 
problem. The older Hermes machine continued to operate without a 
surge problem or protector on the same circuit on which the new 
machine failed to operate properly. 
4. In October, 1987, the company moved its offices 
from 654 South 900 East to 4001 South 700 East, Suite 520. The 
machine was still not working properly. On February 5 and 29, 
1988 because the new machine was still not working properly and 
the Defendant did not replace it or repair it, Affiant instructed 
his attorney to revoke acceptance. On March 23, 1988 this action 
was filed for replacement of the machine or rescission or refund 
of the purchase price since the machine still failed to operate 
properly. 
5. Just prior to two court proceedings, the Defendant 
called and said that they would send a repairman to fix the 
machine but never did and to this date have failed to do so. 
6. In April, 1988 Associated Business Products 
repairman who was on the premises to repair other office 
equipment, volunteered to look at the Hermes 51 Typewriter and 
after removing the cover, found a broken wire which made the 
machine inoperable. There never was the need for a surge 
protector and this was never a problem with the machine. 
7. The machine was repaired by someone other than the 
Defendant four months after the action was filed and five months 
after the Plaintiff had revoked acceptance. The machine had not 
2 
//,
 a___ j'm. DATED t h i s /7)Ly{ day of - A p r i l , 1988. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me, a N o t a r y P u b l i c , t h i s /^4-L 
day of ijfcSl, 1988. 
, ,, , ,/?? ^ 
Notary Public (y 
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the J*V —day of 
-ApLai^ r7 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
of Mary B. Strang, was mailed, postage prepaid to Odell Sanders, 
President, Salt Lake Typewriter Company, 777 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
& 
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